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Abstract 
The FDRE Criminal Justice Policy embodies multiple reforms that are meant to 
address the various problems in the Ethiopian criminal justice system. The reforms 
include the introduction of plea bargaining which represents an unprecedented and 
ambitious development in the realm of the criminal justice system in Ethiopia. 
This article examines plea bargaining as envisaged in the FDRE Criminal Justice 
Policy and the Draft Criminal Procedure Code, from a principle based approach 
and argues that it hardly lives up to many of the fundamental principles of criminal 
law and procedure recognised under Ethiopian law. The most affected 
principles/rights include: the principle of presumption of innocence, the principle 
of equality, the principle of equality of arms, the principle of truth discovery, the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence, and the right to appeal. 
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Introduction 
Plea bargaining not only occupies a central position in many adversarial 
jurisdictions,1 but also transcends diverse jurisdictions including the inquisitorial 
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based on my PhD thesis titled: ` Introducing Plea bargaining in Ethiopia: Concerns and 
prospects`. PhD thesis, University of Warwick, UK, 2014. 
1 No jurisdiction relies on plea bargaining as the USA does –more than 90 percent of 
criminal cases are disposed of using plea bargaining.  See United States Sentencing 
Commission, Statistical Information packet, Fiscal Year 2009 at:  
  <http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2009.htm> (visited on July 14, 2010). While 
researches indicate that about 50% of cases have been settled through plea agreements in 
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structures. Ethiopia is not an exception. Inspired by such developments, it has 
adopted plea bargaining at policy level. It is also reflected in some 
proclamations, albeit not detailed. While defining the powers and duties of the 
Ministry of Justice (currently restructured as the Federal Attorney General), 
Proclamation No. 691/2010 and Proclamation No. 943/2016 entrust the latter 
with the power to plea bargain. This power goes to the newly established 
Federal Attorney General. This together with the policy represents a step 
towards providing a legal/policy framework for plea bargaining in Ethiopia, 
pending the issuance of the new criminal procedure code which is expected to 
address the concept in detail. However, this power of the Federal Attorney 
General is yet to be enforced.2   
This is not to suggest that plea bargaining has no room for application in 
Ethiopia. Some studies reveal that an informal and rudimentary form of plea 
bargaining exists at the investigative stage, usually the suspect being 
unrepresented.3 Prosecutors justify this practice in terms of efficiency and the 
difficulty in obtaining evidence in particular that of witnesses (half a loaf is 
better than none).  The practice of plea bargaining has the following general 
features4: (a) it applies to any crime, (b) the defendant obtains a range of 
concessions from total immunity to sentence or charge reductions, (c) it does not 
involve defence attorneys, (d) it is not enforceable, nor does it form part of the 
record either in the investigation file or in the judgment. 
What is more, cooperation agreements5 are recognized through the Anti-
Corruption6, Anti-terrorism7, and Witness and whistleblowers protection 
                                                                                                            
Germany; around 90% of cases in magistrates’ courts and 67 % in Crown courts get 
disposed of through guilty pleas without a trial. See Maike Frommann (2009), `Regulating 
plea bargaining in Germany: Can the Italian approach serve as a Model to guarantee the 
independence of German Judges`, Hanse Law Review , Vol. 5, p. 200; A. Ashworth and M. 
Redmayne (2010) , The Criminal Process, 4th ed, Oxford University Press, p. 418. 
2  Probably, the fact that the law is generic and the absence of procedural law on the subject 
matter could be partly responsible for this.  As a law meant to define the power and duties 
of the AG/the Ministry, the proclamation simply lists the power and duties of the AG, the 
power to allow plea bargaining being one of them. 
3 See for example Alemu Meheretu (2014), ‘Introducing plea bargaining in Ethiopia: 
concerns and prospects’, (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, UK); UNODC (2011), 
‘Assessment of the Criminal Justice system in Ethiopia; in support of the Government`s 
reform efforts towards an effective and efficient criminal justice system’, p. 54.  
4 Alemu M., supra note 3, ch. 5. 
5 Cooperation agreements are agreements whereby a defendant agrees to cooperate in the 
prosecution of co-offenders by supplying a testimony so that he/she receives lenient 
treatment or immunity. Some literatures see cooperation agreements as one form of plea 
bargaining. But this is not sound because cooperation agreements are about finding 
evidence that will be tested in full scale trials while plea bargaining is about avoiding full 
scale trials. However, it is important to note that the two may overlap in a sense that a 
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Proclamations.8 Despite its practical significance in many jurisdictions, plea 
bargaining has been a subject of controversy since its inception. Detractors 
blame it for undermining fundamental safeguards, risking wrongful convictions, 
and eroding the purpose of criminal sanctions.9 On the other hand, proponents 
dismiss such accusations altogether and capitalize on its positives.10 Yet, some 
prefer to remain in the middle i.e., acknowledging the flaws of plea bargaining 
but at the same time enticed by its practical benefits uphold it and often propose 
reforms to rectify its flaws.11  
Generally, proponents of plea bargaining praise it for its role in managing 
caseload, enhancing the efficiency of the criminal process, and sparing 
                                                                                                            
defendant may plead guilty and at the same time help the prosecution by testifying against 
his accomplices. 
6 Article 43(1), The Federal Anti-corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
(Amendment) Proclamation No. 239/2001. 
7  Article 33, The Anti-terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009. 
8 Article 3, Protection of Witnesses and Whistleblowers of Criminal Offences 
Proclamation No.699/2010. 
9 See for example Guidorizzi, Douglas (1998), ‘Should we really ban Plea bargaining?: The 
core concerns for plea bargaining critics’, Emory L. J.  Vol. 47, p.753 ; Kipnis, Kenneth 
(1976) ,`Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea`, Ethics Vol. 86, p. 93; R.A. Fine 
(1987), ‘Plea bargaining : an unnecessary evil’,  Marquatte law Review, Vol.70 No.4, 
p.615 (arguing that plea bargaining encourages crime by weakening the credibility of  the 
system); Sam W.Calan (1979) ,’An Experience  in Justice without Plea Negotiation`,  Law 
& Society Review Vol. 13 p. 327; Penny Darbyshire (2000), `The mischief of plea 
bargaining and sentencing rewards`, Criminal Law Review; Douglas Smith(1986) ‘The 
Plea-Bargaining Controversy’ Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.77, No.3, 
pp. 949-968.          
10 See for example Joseph A. Colquitt (2000-2001), ‘Ad hoc plea bargaining’, Tul. L. Rev. 
Vol.75, p. 695 (who argues that plea bargaining is a necessary and a legitimate way of 
disposing criminal cases; the only problem lies on the practice where `many of the plea 
agreements struck are inappropriate, unethical, even illegal.`);  John Bowers(2007-
2008),’Punishing the Innocent’, U. Pa. L. Rev. Vol. 156, p.1119  (Where the author argues 
that the innocence problem springs from misperceptions over: ` (1) the characteristics of 
typical innocent defendants, (2) the types of cases they generally face, and (3) the level of 
due process they typically desire`.); Thomas W. Church (1979), `In defense of pleas 
bargaining`, Law & Society Review, Vol.13, No.2, Special Issue on Plea Bargaining , pp. 
509-525. 
11 For some detailed works in this regard see e.g. F.H. Easterbrook (1992), `Plea bargaining 
as compromise, Yale L.J. Vol.101, p. 1969; Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal (2006), 
`Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty`, J.L. & Econ. Vol.49, p.353 (proposing a screening 
model to limit plea bargaining to the guilty); Note (1972), ‘Restructuring the Plea 
Bargain’, Yale L.J.  Vol. 82, p.286 (arguing for judicial participation in plea negotiations); 
Note (1972), ‘Plea Bargaining: the Case for Reform’, U. Rici. L. Rev. Vol.6, p. 325  
(proposing open, formalized plea bargaining procedures). 
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defendants and victims from the trauma of trials,12  while opponents challenge 
the very foundation of plea bargaining as contrary to constitutional principles, 
ethics, and fair trial guarantees.13 This article singles out one dimension of the 
controversy i.e., the debate on whether it is compatible with fundamental 
principles of criminal law and procedure and  interrogates whether plea 
bargaining , as adopted by the criminal justice policy14 and the draft criminal 
procedure code15, lives up to the fundamental principles of criminal law and 
procedure recognised in Ethiopia. Whilst some of such principles are closely 
linked with plea bargaining, others are remotely associated with it. This article 
takes up only those principles (from the former category) which are designed to 
ensure the integrity of the criminal process. It is believed that the article can 
evoke debate and have positive contributions in shaping the proposed law on 
plea bargaining. 
The first two sections of the article highlight the nature and type of plea 
bargaining and the models of plea bargaining in different structures of criminal 
justice. These sections explain plea bargaining, and its types and models. The 
third section briefly deals with policy justifications and the particular model that 
Ethiopia has aimed at. The last section examines whether this model is in 
conformity with principles and rights embodied in the Ethiopian legal regime 
such as the presumption of innocence, the principle of equality and non-
discrimination, the principle of truth finding, the right to silence and the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the principle of equality of arms and the 
right to appeal. This involves analysis of policy documents (the Criminal Justice 
Policy being the main target), the proposed law on criminal procedure, the 
FDRE Constitution, criminal laws and the relevant literature.  
1. Meaning and Types of Plea bargaining 
1.1 Meaning 
Definitions of plea bargaining vary considerably from one context to another. 
Some perceive plea bargaining broadly as any favorable treatment to a 
                                           
12 See for example K.V.K. Santhy (2013), ‘Plea Bargaining in Indian and US Criminal Law: 
Confessions for Concessions’ NALSAR Law Review,Vol.7,No.1, p.99; On the economic 
analysis of plea bargaining, see Landes, William M. (1971), ‘An economic analysis of the 
courts’, J. L. & Econ., Vol.14, No.1, pp. 61-107; Kobayashi, Bruce H. and John R. Lott 
(1996), ‘In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea-bargaining’, Int’l Rev. L. & 
Econ., Vol.16, pp. 397-416. 
13  S. Schulhofer (1991-92), `Plea bargaining as disaster`, Yale L.J. Vol.101, p.1979. 
14 FDRE (2011), The Criminal Justice Policy of Ethiopia, (Here in after the Criminal Justice 
Policy). 
15 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Draft Criminal Procedure Code, 2013 as 
was valid in June 2013. 
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defendant in return to not only pleading guilty but also waiving some rights as 
the right to appeal and the right to a preliminary hearing and testifying against 
other suspects.16 However, this seems to unduly expand plea bargaining and 
confuse it with the broader spectrum of negotiated justice which involves many 
concessions. Simply put, all negotiated justice is not plea bargaining, but plea 
bargaining is one form of negotiated justice. 
Plea bargaining has been defined as ‘any agreement by the accused to plead 
guilty in return for a promise of benefit’.17 In a similar fashion, plea bargaining 
is defined as ‘the defendant`s agreement to plead guilty to a criminal charge 
with the reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration from the 
state’.18  In both definitions the defendant by pleading guilty (and not standing 
as a witness for fellow offenders, as some prefer to include) agrees to trade 
his/her right to full scale trial in exchange for ‘some considerations from the 
state’. Some suggest that the phrase ‘with reasonable expectation of receiving 
benefit’ includes what is termed as implicit plea bargaining in a sense that the 
offer need not necessarily come expressly from the prosecutor. Instead, 
reasonable expectation of the defendant to be treated leniently by pleading 
guilty suffices to imply plea bargains.19 In various literature, this is sometimes 
referred to as implicit plea bargaining 
However, this conception unnecessarily expands the ambit of plea bargaining 
to include any guilty plea disposal of cases. This means that one can find plea 
bargaining in any jurisdiction which does not recognize or practice plea 
bargaining per se but simply allows guilty plea disposal of criminal cases. Such 
expansive conception overstretches the notion of plea bargaining off the mark. 
                                           
16 See William F. McDonald (1979), ‘From Plea negotiation to coercive Justice: Notes on 
the respecification of a concept’, Law & Society Review, Vol. 13, pp.389-90.Testifying 
against other suspects, often known as cooperation agreements is different from plea 
bargaining. While cooperation agreements are about finding evidence and thus do not 
avoid full-scale trials, plea bargaining is about avoiding or shortening full-scale trials. 
“when one defendant agrees to testify against another … his statements will be subject to 
refutation and critical evaluation in the courtroom”, a phenomenon alien in plea bargains. 
See Alschuler (1979) , `Plea bargaining and its History`, Colum L. Rev.Vol.79, p.4. On the 
contrary, some recognize cooperation agreements as one form of plea bargaining. See 
William F. McDonald, already cited. 
17 Joseph Di Luca (2005), ‘Expedient MC Justice or Principled Dispute Resolutions? A 
review of plea bargaining in Canada`, Crim. L.Q., Vol.50, p.14 [citing Law Reform 
Commission of Canada (1975), Criminal Procedure: Control of the process, working 
paper No 15, p. 45]. 
18 William F. McDonald (1979), ‘From Plea negotiation to coercive Justice: Notes on the 
Respecification of a Concept’, Law & Society Review, Vol. 13, Special Issue on Plea 
Bargaining, p.388 [citing Herbert S. Miller et al (1978), Plea bargaining in the United 
States]. 
19 Ibid.  
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Another limitation of the above definitions is that they do not specify the 
considerations defendants get in exchange to pleading guilty. The broad nature 
of the definitions may create an impression that any form of concession even if 
unrelated to sentence or charge may be included. Nonetheless, it must be 
understood that such considerations should manifest themselves only in lower 
sentences or charges or some favorable facts.20 Thus, plea bargaining can be 
defined as a form of negotiation/settlement between the state and the defendant 
whereby the latter agrees to plead guilty in return to charge or sentence 
concessions.21 These concessions take the form of less severe charges or 
dropping of charges/counts (commonly referred to as charge bargaining) or 
some leniency regarding the punishment (sentence bargaining). It is this 
definition that will be employed in this article.  
1.2  Types of plea bargaining: charge bargaining and sentence 
bargaining  
Generally, the type of concessions a defendant gets in exchange for pleading 
guilty determines the type of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining  that involves 
reduction of either the number of charges (counts) or the severity of charges 
(offences) is commonly referred to as charge bargaining; whereas, a type of  
bargaining which involves a recommendation of more lenient sentence is 
referred to as sentence bargaining. 
Charge bargaining represents a kind of negotiation where a defendant agrees 
to plead guilty to a criminal charge in return for dismissal of one of the counts or 
the defendant pleading guilty for a lesser charge than he/she could otherwise 
face at the trial.22 The former is known as horizontal plea bargaining and the 
latter vertical plea bargaining.23 Charge bargaining does not directly involve the 
sentence the defendant receives although the driving force behind it obviously 
rests on the desire to get the least possible sentence for a reduced charge. 
Inquisitorial/mixed structures are generally skeptical of the virtues of charge 
bargaining. For instance, Germany and Italy, by expressly proscribing it, 
exclusively rely on sentence bargaining; and so does Russia. In contrast, 
                                           
20 For some detailed list of concessions that may accrue to a defendant see Cohen and Doob 
(1989-90), `Public Attitudes to Plea bargaining`, C.L.Q  Vol.32,pp. 86-87.  
21 Black`s Law (8th ed. 2004), p. 3657, defines the term in a similar fashion as:  
    A negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the 
defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange for 
some concession by the prosecutor, usu. a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the 
other charges.  
22 Ibid   
23 While vertical charge bargaining relates to the severity of the charge (a charge of first 
degree homicide can be lowered to that of ordinary homicide), horizontal charge 
bargaining affects the counts (one or more of the several counts may be dropped). 
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adversarial structures such as USA consider charge bargaining as part of a 
prosecutor`s charging discretion and thus put very limited restraint on it. In 
England too, charge bargaining, which often takes place well before the charge 
is formally filed, is less objectionable than sentence bargaining which in some 
way involves the judge, and is in effect, believed to interfere with his /her 
neutrality.24 
Under sentence bargaining, the prosecutor agrees to propose lenient sentence 
following the defendant`s guilty plea, and the concessions may include shorter 
prison terms, probation or referring to rehabilitation centers.25 Some further 
expand the scope of sentence bargaining to include a wide range of 
concessions.26 Sentence bargaining appears to involve an abandonment of the 
judge`s sentencing responsibility.27 Nevertheless, at least in theory, this is not 
the case as it is up to the judge to endorse or reject such recommendations. It is 
interesting to note that sentence bargaining varies across jurisdictions. Unlike 
adversarial systems, its scope is much more limited in inquisitorial procedures. 
The limitation manifests itself in the type of the offense it applies to, the type of 
concessions involved and the amount of sentence that can be reduced by 
negotiation.28 
                                           
24 Francoise Tulkens,(2005), ‘Negotiated Justice’, [in Demas–Marty and J.R. Spencer, 
Editors(2005), European Criminal Procedures 4th ed, (Cambridge University Press),      
p. 665]. 
25 Larry K. Gaines and Roger Leroy Miller,(2009) Criminal Justice in Action, (Cengage 
Learning, Inc,), p. 295. For more discussion, see for example Sanders, et al (2007), 
Criminal Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
26  Such concessions include:  
 “judges agreeing to impose specific time limits on probation...;prosecutors refraining 
from raising special sentencing provisions for repeat offenders; prosecutors 
remaining silent at the sentencing hearing ;or not opposing defendants request for 
leniency or specialized rehabilitation program; prosecutors downplaying the harm to 
the victims; and agreement that a defendant serves sentence at a particular 
institution;..., imposition of a fine or restitution; prosecutors  agreeing to schedule 
sentencing before a lenient judge.”  
   See Kress(1980), Prescription for Justice: the theory and the Practice of Sentencing 
Guidelines, 87  cited in  William W. Wilkins(1988), `Plea negotiation ,Acceptance of 
responsibility, Role of the offender and departures :Policy decision in the promulgation of 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’, Wake Forest L. Rev. ,Vol. 23, pp. 185-86. 
27 Ibid. 
28 While sentence bargaining in adversarial procedure in general applies across the board to 
all crimes and the amount of sentence concession is not limited (at least statutorily), it 
works otherwise in inquisitorial procedures- the type of offence and the amount of 
sentence concession are statutorily fixed. See Generally Stephen C. Thaman (2007), `Plea 
bargaining, Negotiating Confessions and Consensual Resolution of Criminal cases` 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 11. 
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2. Models of Plea Bargaining and Structures of Criminal 
Procedure 
Plea bargaining has its roots in the adversarial systems.29 Some even go further 
to make it adversarial by nature.30 Researches indicate that it is perceived as `the 
ultimate expression’ of ‘adversarialism’, giving parties maximum control over 
the case outcome.31 An intriguing question which is often raised is why plea 
bargaining has long characterized the adversarial structures and not the 
inquisitorial? Although it is difficult to label plea bargaining as adversarial as 
some suggest, studies show that it derives its existence from this structure of 
criminal procedure.32 Relatively, this structure is configured and works in such a 
way to lend itself for negotiation in the context of a criminal process that 
involves a dispute between autonomous parties.33 This together with the fact that 
resolution of disputes naturally involves negotiation makes adversarial 
structures suitable for plea bargaining to flourish. 
This can be contrasted with the inquisitorial system`s official inquiry of the 
truth and their conviction that truth cannot be negotiated.34 Moreover, the  guilty 
plea procedure, the passivity of the judge and  the  nearly unfettered charging  
power of  the prosecutor, which are some of  the features of adversarial systems 
but non-existent in inquisitorial systems, afford a fertile ground to negotiate on 
                                           
29 See Lawrence M. Friedman (1978-79), ‘Plea bargaining in historical perspective’, Law & 
Soc’y Rev. Vol. 13, p. 247; A. W. Alschuler (1979), ‘Plea bargaining and its History’, 
Colum L. Rev. Vol.79,p.1 ; Malcolm M. Feeley (1997), `Legal Complexity and the 
Transformation of the Criminal Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining`, Isr. L. Rev., 
Vol. 13, pp. 202-05. 
30 Some argue that the fact that plea bargaining places the adversarial trait of leaving the 
criminal proceeding to the party`s control than to the judge, makes it adversarial. On the 
other hand, others claim to the contrary –they maintain that plea bargaining collapses the 
power of investigation, charging, sentencing into the hands of one actor, the prosecutor– 
and relies on written evidence (the plea agreement instead of tested oral evidence). In this 
sense, it resembles inquisitorial structures. On these debates, see generally Gerard E. 
Lynch (1998), ‘Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice’, Fordham L. Rev.,Vol. 
66, p. 2117 ; Maximo Langer (2005-06), ‘Rethinking plea bargaining: the practice and 
reform of prosecutorial adjudication in the American Criminal Procedure’, Am. J. Crim. 
L. Vol.33, p. 223. 
31 Jacqueline Hodgson and Andrew Roberts (2010), ‘An Agenda for Empirical Research in 
Criminal Justice: Criminal process and prosecution’, Legal Studies Research Paper No 
2010-13, p. 25. (Showing their reservations on such labeling of plea bargaining). 
32 Supra note 29. 
33 See Mirjan Damaska (1975), ‘Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal 
Procedure’, Yale L.J., Vol. 84, p. 480. 
34 Ibid. 
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guilty pleas and thus for plea bargaining to function.35 What is more, unlike 
inquisitorial systems, the principle of discretionary prosecution forms an 
important source of discretion for prosecutors in the adversarial structures to 
choose whom to charge, what to charge, how much to reduce, and even to drop 
charges altogether. All these flexibilities, which are prerequisites for plea 
bargaining, are present in adversarial structures.36 
In contrast, the continental rule of compulsory prosecution37 seems to 
contradict the adversarial style of plea bargaining. So long as sufficient evidence 
exists, prosecutors must proceed to trial and defendants cannot abort the trial by 
just confessing or pleading guilty. Also, the guilty plea which is the subject of 
negotiation in plea bargaining is generally unknown in inquisitorial systems.38 
Confession by the accused may not exempt the prosecution from proving its 
case, and still the court may find the accused not guilty. It is also suggested that 
plea bargaining is ill-suited with the inquisitorial version of truth –substantive 
truth.39 All these mixed with the negative stance of inquisitorial jurisdictions to 
plea bargaining40 evoke the query as to how plea bargaining works in these 
jurisdictions.   
                                           
35 Ibid. See also Thomas Weigend (2008), ‘the decay of the Inquisitorial Ideal: plea 
bargaining evades German Criminal procedure’[in John Jackson et al editors, (2008), 
Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and international context, (Hart 
Publishing), p. 63. 
36 Yet it does not mean that plea bargaining is something alien to the inquisitorial systems. 
Maintaining their inquisitorial nature to some extent, inquisitorial countries have been 
incorporating some adversarial elements including jury trials and plea bargaining. See 
generally Stephen C. Thaman, supra note 28; Mirjan Damaska, supra note 33. 
37 This is not to suggest that all continental systems adhere to this rule horizontally. 
Variations exist depending on whether a country follows ‘the expediency principle’ or 
‘the legality principle’. See Yue Ma (2002), `Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining 
in the United States, France, Germany and Italy: A Comparative Perspective` 
International Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 12, p.30. 
38 Stefano Maffei (2004), “Negotiations on ‘evidence’ and Negotiations on ‘sentence` in 
Italy: Adversarial Experiments in Italian Criminal Procedure”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, pp. 1050-1069. 
39 See Thomas Weigend (2003) ‘Is the Criminal Process about Truth? A German 
Perspective’, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 26, p. 171 (`plea bargaining 
cannot be reconciled with the inquisitorial version of truth-seeking`). 
40 For instance in Russia, plea bargaining was met with strong opposition: ‘In the Russian 
criminal justice an agreement (in Russian sdelka) –is an immoral, reprehensible, dishonest 
phenomenon; it is a bargain demeaning the government (vlast) suggesting its 
helplessness, its inability to solve crimes ... . Negotiations will demean the investigator, 
the prosecutor and the judge since they will have to bargain with the criminal...` See S 
Pomorski (2007) ‘Modern Russian Criminal Procedure: The Adversarial Principle and 
Guilty plea’ Criminal Law Forum Vol.17, p.129 [citing I. Petrukhin, ‘Agreements 
Regarding Confession of Guilt Are Alien to Russian Mentality’]. Here it is important to 
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Nonetheless, with an increasing demand for efficiency, the principle of 
compulsory prosecution has become liberalized in inquisitorial systems to 
accommodate some trial alternatives. The practice which once was described as 
typical of adversarial systems has become increasingly common in inquisitorial 
systems, although, in a different shape. The inquisitorial variant of plea 
bargaining exhibits marked differences from its counterpart in the adversarial 
system. Perhaps the difference starts from naming: most inquisitorial systems 
that introduced plea bargaining did not prefer to use the term plea bargaining.41  
The inquisitorial variant of plea bargaining is very limited in scope.42 It is 
applied to a limited range of relatively less serious crimes; it passes through 
strict court scrutiny;43 the amount of sentence discount is usually statutorily 
fixed; and charge and fact bargains are outlawed.44 In so doing, inquisitorial 
jurisdictions have tried to adopt plea bargaining in a controlled and cautious way 
so that the propensity of using wide sentencing differentials to induce a plea of 
guilty becomes minimal.45 Conversely, plea bargaining in adversarial structures 
is generally wider in scope. It applies to all crimes and it involves all 
forms/types of plea bargaining (charge, sentence, and fact).  Moreover, a 
                                                                                                            
note that all the literature in inquisitorial structures is not repugnant to plea bargaining.  
Some argue that plea bargaining which provides defendants a new role of influencing the 
outcome of the case to their advantage, is preferable over the traditional inquisitorial 
systems which are dominated by a judge whose purpose is to get confession. For the 
presentation of some detailed accounts, see Markus D. Dubber and Mark G. Kelman 
(2009), American Criminal Law, Cases, Statutes, and Comments, 2nd ed., Foundation 
Press, p. 99.  
41 For instance, while Italy calls it ‘application of sentence at the request of parties’; Russia  
and Germany  use  ‘agreement with the field charges’ and ‘negotiated agreement’ 
respectively. More than the naming, however, what is important is the content of plea 
bargaining. 
42 Civil law traditions such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Poland, Colombia, 
and Russia all adopt the limited form of plea bargaining, though the scope of its 
application varies among them. 
43 In Italy for instance, the judge must supervise the Italian equivalent of plea bargaining  –
patteggiamento or party– agreed sentence and must give reasons for such settlements 
including the congruity of sentence with the crime. See Jeffrey J. Miller (1990),` Plea 
Bargaining and Its Analogues Under the New Italian Criminal Procedure Code and in the 
United States: Toward a New Understanding of Comparative Criminal Procedure`, N.Y.U. 
J. INT'L L. & POL. Vol. 22, p. 215. 
44 The most common discount in such countries is one-third reduction of the normal 
sentence which would have been imposed after trial. Such is the case for example in 
France, Italy, Columbia, Spain and Lithuania. See Stephen C. Thaman , supra note 28.  
45 These coupled with the nature of the public prosecutor in inquisitorial systems –the fact 
that s/he is not a party to criminal proceedings and thus would not strive to obtain 
convictions like its counterpart in adversarial systems, could serve as an important check 
on the prosecutor’s discretion in plea bargaining. 
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statutorily fixed sentence discount is unknown in adversarial structures. A 
typical example is the USA`s model which takes an extreme form where 
prosecutors are often accused of threatening defendants with huge sentence 
differentials so that they plead guilty.46   
From the foregoing discussions in general and  based on its scope of 
application and the range of discretion it vests in the prosecution in particular, 
one can identify two models of plea bargaining: the unrestricted/ unlimited 
model and the restricted/limited model. The first model refers to the unlimited 
form of plea bargaining which is common in most adversarial systems. It 
usually involves broader prosecutorial discretion –unlimited sentencing 
concessions, all types of plea bargaining– sentence, charge, fact bargains, etc.  
On the other hand, the restricted model denotes a more restrained form of plea 
bargaining where the prosecutor`s discretion in plea bargains is limited. Under 
the restricted model, concessions are regulated (usually plea bargaining applies 
to limited range of relatively less serious crimes with a statutorily fixed discount 
and rigorous judicial scrutiny), charge and fact bargains are outlawed. This form 
of plea bargaining is quintessential to inquisitorial/mixed structures. Throughout 
this article, such distinctions will be used in the course of making reference to 
the models.   
3. Policy Justifications and the Targeted Model in Ethiopia 
3.1 Policy justifications of plea bargaining47  
The FDRE Criminal Justice Policy embodies reforms aimed at:48 (1) introducing 
plea bargaining and compensation for miscarriage of justice (2) strengthening 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR), legal representation and the 
capacity of investigative organs, among others. Of these, the introduction of plea 
bargaining represents an unprecedented development in the Ethiopian criminal 
justice system.  The Policy tries to justify the reasons that motivate Ethiopia to 
introduce plea bargaining. The policy tries to justify plea bargaining from 
diverse perspectives. The policy justifications that motivate Ethiopia to 
introduce plea bargaining include: efficiency for the justice system, remorse and 
                                           
46 See for example. Ronald F. Wright (2005), ‘Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in 
Federal Criminal Justice’,  U. PA. L. REV. Vol. 154 ,p. 79; Maximo Langer, supra note 
30. 
47 Here the purpose is to briefly mention the policy justifications of plea bargaining as stated 
in the criminal justice policy. For an appraisal of the justifications. See Alemu Meheretu , 
supra note 3. See also Alemu M., An appraisal of plea bargaining policy and purposes in 
Ethiopia, forthcoming. 
48  The Criminal Justice Policy section 14, supra note 14, p. 30. 
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rehabilitation of offenders, and protecting victims and defendants from the 
trauma of trials. 
a) Efficiency:  
It is often submitted that plea bargaining offers efficiency advantage to the 
justice system. With the sophistication of criminal law, trials have become 
extremely complex and resource intensive. Plea bargaining by cutting short 
resources, time and energy consumed in the criminal process, expedites justice. 
The Criminal Justice Policy subscribes to this justification in providing that plea 
bargaining cuts costs and time spent in full scale trials; it also relies on the 
caseload management justification –that plea bargaining helps reduce case 
backlog and workload.49 
b) Remorse:  
The policy validates plea bargaining from remorse perspective –that by 
encouraging remorse, plea bargaining facilitates the rehabilitation of offenders.50  
Here the assumption is that a remorseful defendant will take lessons from 
his/her past wrong and is less likely to commit another crime, and hence 
deserves less moral condemnation than defendants who insist on challenging the 
prosecution`s case. 
c) Avoiding the trauma of trials:  
The Policy further tries to justify plea bargaining from the perspective of victims 
and defendants, claiming that it benefits both by shielding them from the trauma 
of public trials.51 It is suggested that in addition to minimizing trial 
inconvenience, plea bargaining has the benefit of avoiding the stigma and 
embarrassment of going public in a trial both for the defendant and the victim. 
While the defendant, by pleading guilty to a lesser crime, avoids the high public 
sigma associated with serious crimes, victims are spared from facing the 
offender at the examination stage.  
3.2 The Model targeted by Ethiopia  
Although plea bargaining originated from common law legal systems (like the 
USA and the UK) that are adversarial systems, it has now been transplanted in 
varying degrees to other systems of criminal procedure including the classical 
inquisitorial systems. While most of these jurisdictions have adopted plea 
bargaining in its limited form, some have preferred to have it in its unlimited 
form. Ethiopia is not an exception to this. Enticed with such developments, 
Ethiopia has adopted plea bargaining at a policy level.  The Draft Criminal 
                                           
49 Id., p. 36. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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Procedure Code which is underway, at a very slow pace, has also incorporated 
plea bargaining. The reading of the provisions of the Draft Criminal Procedure 
Code and the Criminal Justice Policy52 suggests that the targeted version of plea 
bargaining has the following general features: 
First, it is broader in scope, covering any crime across the board and all the 
commonly known types of plea bargaining –charge bargaining, sentence 
bargaining and fact bargaining.53 Unlike, most countries (especially those from 
the inquisitorial structure) that transplant plea bargaining in its restricted model, 
Ethiopia seems to prefer emulating plea bargaining nearly as applied in 
adversarial systems.  
Second, the power to plea bargain vests in the public prosecutor, excluding 
the police and the courts. The Draft Code expressly reserves this power to the 
prosecutor.  
Third, the Policy and the Draft Code provide legal conditions for plea 
bargaining. These include the voluntariness requirement, the duty of disclosure, 
the requirement of sufficient evidence, and in principle mandatory legal 
representation.54 To the extent they are translated into action, these guarantees 
can influence plea bargaining positively, although they hardly ensure the 
fairness and accuracy of the system.55 Here it is important to note that the 
`Ethiopian variant` though framed along the unlimited model, exhibits some 
variations on legal conditions. A case in point is the requirement of sufficient 
evidence. This requirement which apparently has no parallel in those 
jurisdictions that uphold the unlimited model, requires that plea bargaining can 
be validly made only after the investigation has produced sufficient evidence of 
guilt. If the enforceability of this requirement is ensured, 56 it could enhance but 
not guarantee the integrity of plea bargaining.  
Fourth, as it stands now, the amount of concessions in plea bargains is left 
for the discretion of the prosecutor. In contrast to most inquisitorial jurisdictions 
                                           
52 See for example Article 219, 221 and 230 of the FDRE Draft Code, supra note 15 and 
section 4.5.4 of the Criminal Justice Policy, supra note 14, p. 36. 
53 The Criminal Justice Policy p. 37; see also Article 230 of the Draft code, supra note 15.  
54 Article 221 of the Draft Code, supra note 15.  
55 See section 4 below. 
56 As it stands now the requirement suffers from serious limitations that can reduce it to a 
mere formality.  It is not clear whether the requirement is subject to ex ante judicial 
review. The standard used to measure sufficiency and reliability of evidence is not clear, 
either (it makes little sense if a standard higher than the one used to press for a charge is 
not used). Most importantly, pre-charge bargaining which is permissible under the 
Ethiopian variant of plea bargaining can be effectively used to circumvent the 
requirement of sufficient evidence and negotiate on weak cases. 
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which put a fixed discount of one-third,57 the Ethiopian variant does not fix the 
amount of concessions. Yet, the possibility of having fixed discounts is not 
totally closed because the draft law or subsequent guidelines can still provide for 
fixed discounts. 
From the above, it is plain that Ethiopia has, at least at a policy level, adopted 
the unrestrained model with minor modifications. This chiefly relates to the 
preconditions attached to the model under consideration: the requirement of 
sufficient evidence being the main one. The following section investigates the 
compatibility of this model with fundamental principles of criminal procedure 
enshrined in the FDRE Constitution and other Ethiopian laws.  
4. Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law and Procedure 
at Stake 
This section does not claim to discuss principles of Ethiopian criminal law and 
procedure in detail. Rather, it tries to briefly sketch those fundamental principles 
and rights which are likely to be affected by the introduction of plea bargaining 
and investigate how the proposed `Ethiopian version` of plea  bargaining  fares 
with them. 
4.1 The presumption of innocence 
The presupmtion of innocence forms one of the cardinal constitutional 
principles in many jurisdictions. The FDRE Constitution unconditionally 
guarantees  the right of an accused person to be presumed innocent until guilt is 
established by a court of law.58 Yet, the Criminal Justice Policy59, the Draft 
Criminal Procedure Code60 and some statutory laws such as the Anti-corruption 
law limit the scope of the right by shifting the burden of proof to the accused. 
The Policy envisions further limtations of the right by law. Such limitations, in 
addition to the doubts with regard to their constitutionalty, could pose a serious 
threat to the right.61 This is not to suggest that the presumption should remain 
                                           
57 This refers to the maximum amount of sentence concession the prosecutor may grant to a 
defendant in exchange for pleading guilty. 
58 Article 20, The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
Proclamation No. 1/1995. 
59 The policy allows onus reversal in some serious crimes such as terrorism , corruption, 
organized crimes and crimes against constitutional order. There is one precondition for 
this –the prosecutor needs to establish basic facts first. See the Criminal Justice  Policy, 
supra note 14,  section 4.4  at 33.  
60 Article 5(3), the Draft Criminal Procedure Code, supra note 15.   
61 In particular, the permission of further limitations of the right by law could provide the 
executive impetus to further erode the right. 
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absolute. It can be limited in exceptional cases as is the case elsewhere,62 
provided that such limitations do not violate the Constitution. Apart from 
questions of constitutionality, the permissibility of further limitations, 
limitations of the presumption in serious crimes63 and  its propensity to wider 
interpretation and abuse evoke concerns. 
Proponents argue that plea bargaining is in tandem with the presumption of 
innocence and serves as an effective tool to single out the guilty from the 
innocent.64 The assumption for this argument is that innocent defendants would 
choose trial over plea bargaining and only the guilty would be targeted by plea 
bargaining. Yet, there is no conclusive evidence to support this; quite to the 
contrary empirical evidence elsewhere suggests that both the innocent and the 
guilty are indiscriminately targeted, if not the reverse.65 With increasing 
                                           
62 Generally, for modalities of putting limitations to the presumption/onus reversal in Europe 
(presumption of intent in some crimes which requires the defendant to rebut this, defences 
and justifications, reversal of onus in specific minor crimes), see J.R Spencer (2005), 
‘Evidence’ [in Mireillie Delmas–Marthy and J.R Spencer, editors (2005), European 
Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press), pp.597-99].  
63 As shown above, the limitation concerns serious crimes as terrorism, organized crimes, 
corruption and crimes against constitutional order. This seems worrying in Ethiopia for 
two reasons. First, unlike most jurisdictions where reversal of onus applies to less serious 
infractions of law (Example France), it works for serious crimes which carry capital or 
life punishments. In fact, in Italy there were attempts to introduce by law the reversal of 
onus in serious crimes (organized crimes and corruption). Nevertheless, it was soon 
rejected as unconstitutional. See Ibid. Secondly, our weak political culture means the 
limitations are susceptible to abuse by the executive. Indeed, there are reports of 
politically motivated prosecutions and convictions involving the above crimes.  See for 
example, Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 2012, United States Department 
of State available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/af/204120.htm,visited on 
14/3/13. The report claims that there are about 400 political prisoners in Ethiopia. 
Recently following the Supreme Court`s upholding of 18 years and life sentences of one 
journalist and one opposition leader respectively, the US Government openly slammed 
Ethiopia of its politically motivated prosecutions of government critics; See also Assefa 
Fiseha (2011) , ‘Separation of Powers and Its Implication for the Judiciary in Ethiopia`, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies,Vol.5, No.4, pp.702-715; See Linn A. Hammergren 
(2012), ‘Justice Sector corruption in Ethiopia’, [in Janelle Plummer, editors(2012), 
Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia: Perception, realities and the way forward for key 
sectors, p. 215.] (reporting concerns that: Political authorities or higher-level officers 
direct police to ignore complaints, undertake investigations, or arrest “suspects” without 
probable cause.) 
64 See Andrew Hessick and Reshma M. Saujani (2001-2002), ‘Plea Bargaining and 
Convicting the Innocent: the Role of the Prosecutor, the Defence Counsel and the Judge’, 
Byu J. Pub. L., Vol. 16, pp. 232. (Raising the argument and critiquing it). 
65 See John Baldwin & Michael McConville (1978), ‘Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation 
in England’, Law & Soc’y Rev.,Vol.13, pp.296–98 (discussing the innocence problem of 
plea bargaining in England); Samuel R. Gross et al (2005)., ‘Exonerations in the United 
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concessions tailored against the chance of acquittal66 along with strong risk 
aversion desire of innocent persons (than the guilty)67 and their  mistrust of the 
system68, innocents are likely to choose plea bargaining and plead guilty simply 
because they believe it is rational to do so. Most importantly, the argument 
seems to ignore the implicit presumption of guilt underlying the plea bargaining 
system without which the latter does not ‘procedurally function’.69  
Some proponents further argue that the onus of reversal involved in plea 
bargaining can be taken as an exception to the presumption: ‘the presumption 
provides for interferences such as plea bargaining’.70 However, it is unrealistic 
to label plea bargaining an exception –a dominant system in many jurisdictions 
(adversarial structures in particular) which induces every defendant, including 
the innocent, to plead guilty with attractive concessions on the assumption that 
they might be guilty. There is no support that plea bargaining forms one of the 
commonly recognised exceptions to the presumption.71 The FDRE Constitution 
accommodates no exception to the presumption that it guarantees, and, in effect, 
the possibility of making such caveats seems closed at least for now. 
Plea bargaining in general and the proposed ‘Ethiopian version’ in particular 
operates in disregard of the principle of presumption of innocence in two 
                                                                                                            
States: 1989 through 2003’, J. crim. L. & Criminology , Vol. 95, p.536 (finding 6 % ( 20 
out of 340) of exonerated defendants pled guilty); Albert W. Alschuler (1981), ‘The 
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate’, Cal. L. Rev. Vol. 69, p.714. 
66 Studies in some jurisdictions document such trends and some argue that this is ‘well-
designed to produce the conviction of innocents’. See Albert W. Alschuler, supra note 65, 
pp. 714-15. 
67 Studies show that the innocent is inherently more risk averse than the criminal because the 
latter willingly assumes risk while breaking the law in the first place. Innocents mistrust 
the criminal process for charging them for a crime they did not commit. Unlike the guilty, 
they are not psychologically prepared to face the repercussions of public trials. 
Prosecutors offer innocents similar concessions as the guilty. However, because of 
difference in evaluating risk, the innocent attaches higher value for it and may choose the 
lesser evil –plea bargaining. See Andrew Hessick and Reshma M. Saujani, supra note 59, 
p.201; See also Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerrety (1995), ‘Some Experimental 
Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties 
and Risk’, J. Legal Stud., Vol. 24, p.138.   
68`Some innocent defendants are so mistrustful of the system that they believe their guilt is a 
foregone conclusion if they stand trial, and so they readily accept any inducement to 
plead. These feelings of mistrust are sometimes nourished by defence counsel who begin 
with a presumption of client guilt, and both begin and end the representation by looking 
for the best available bargain`. See Andrew D. Leipold (2005), ‘How the Pre-trial Process 
Contributes to Wrongful Convictions’, Am. Crim. L. Rev. Vol. 42, p. 1154.     
69 See Elizabeth T. Lear (1993), Is Conviction Irrelevant?, UCLA L. REV. Vol. 40, p.1222. 
70 See Samantha J. Cheesman (2014), A comparative Analysis of Plea Bargaining and the 
Subsequent Tension with an Effective and Fair Legal Defence, (PhD thesis), p. 231. 
71 For some notes on such exceptions, supra note 63. 
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respects. First, the plea bargaining offer from the prosecution presupposes an 
implicit presumption of guilt; i.e., in making offers to negotiate, the prosecutor 
assumes that the defendant is guilty.72 This is plain in particular in pre-charge 
bargaining (which is permissible in Ethiopia) at which point the prosecution has 
no sufficient evidence to press for a charge. This clearly contradicts with the 
principle. Second, plea bargaining lowers the standard of proof. It relies not on 
evidence as such73 rather on the admission of guilt which is likely to be tailored 
based on the strength of evidence –the probability of prevailing at trial and the 
weight of concessions.  
Procedural requirements like presumption of innocence and heightened 
standard of proof are ‘intended to prevent inaccurate convictions even at the 
expense of inaccurate acquittals’.74  Plea bargaining defies this by trading-off 
the reliability of convictions to efficiency and economic gains. It permits the 
prosecution to evade rigorous standards of due process and proof.75 This is 
alarming in jurisdictions like Ethiopia whose criminal process exhibits serious 
limitations in upholding due process and ensuring the reliability of convictions. 
Apparently, the requirement of sufficient evidence, a legal condition put to 
the ‘Ethiopian version’ of plea bargaining, could enhance the standard of proof 
and thus outcome accuracy. Yet, this appears to be unrealistic. This is a 
determination made by the prosecutor based on untested evidence with little or 
no pre-trial safeguards to ensure its reliability –no lawyer present, little 
prosecutorial supervision, no defined standard to measure sufficiency,76 no ex 
ante judicial review; even ex post review and its effects remains equivocal.77  
                                           
72  See generally Sanders, Andrew et al (2010), Criminal Justice , Oxford University Press,  
p. 496. 
73 When one counts out the guilty plea as unreliable, at best a lower standard of proof which 
is required for pressing of criminal charges is  used to convict the accused and at worst 
this requirement could be circumvented. Indeed, this possibility is very high in particular 
with pre-charge plea bargaining permissible.  For more discussion on the standard of 
proof used in plea bargaining, see Gregory M. Gilchrist, Gregory M. Gilchrist (2011), 
‘Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy’, Am. Crim. L. Rev. Vol.48, p.153 (‘Where 
trials are avoided, the standard of proof required for a conviction can be reduced to mere 
probable cause’). On the other hand, some suggest that beyond reasonable doubt or even 
a higher standard of beyond all doubt can be comfortably met if defendants ‘candidly’ 
admit their guilt (plea bargaining). See Richard L. Lippke (2011), The Ethics of Plea 
Bargaining, Oxford University Press, p. 221.  But, this is hardly ensured in plea bargains. 
74 George E. Dix (1977), ‘Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful 
Analysis’, Tax. L. Rev. Vol.55, p. 240. 
75 Douglas D. Guidorizzi, supra note 9 at 768. 
76 The standard is yet to be determined by the prosecutor general. See The Criminal Justice 
Policy, supra note 14, section 3.10 at 13 (which demands that the Prosecutor General 
issues directives that provide standards on this). Yet, such approach has its own 
limitations: First, given the policy’s focus on efficiency, the office of the prosecution is 
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Nor is the possibility of using illegally or improperly obtained evidence ruled 
out. Indeed, the criminal justice policy envisages such possibility as an 
exception.78 Thus, the likelihood of inducing guilty pleas with a prosecution 
having no prospect of success cannot be dismissed; if not highly probable. In 
fact, this is not mere speculation at least in trials because empirical evidence 
shows that prosecutors often institute charges without sufficient evidence and 
preparation.79 Plea bargaining is conducive for this since prosecutors have little 
incentive to weed out weak cases.80  
Specifically, pre-charge bargaining which is permissible under the proposed 
variant of plea bargaining can be effectively used to circumvent the requirement 
of sufficient evidence and negotiate on weak cases. All these coupled with 
institutional pressure to raise efficiency and own interest to maximize 
performance could provide prosecutors with good incentives to circumvent the 
requirement of sufficient evidence. In the circumstances, the requirement of 
sufficient evidence is likely to remain a mere formalism.  
4.2 The principle of equality  
Both the FDRE Constitution and the Criminal Code embody the principle of 
equality and proscribe discrimination among defendants ‘on grounds of race, 
nation, nationality, or other social origin, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, property, birth or other status’.81 However, by treating 
                                                                                                            
less likely to restrain itself meaningfully using its own guidelines. Second, effective 
enforcement mechanisms of the rules may presuppose external review. But weak culture 
of judicial review would mean that the guidelines are rarely challenged before courts of 
law. 
77 It is not clear whether the court must review prosecution evidence before it approves the 
plea agreement. In fact, it is required to check the consistency of the agreement with the 
law and morals (Article 232 of the Draft Code). Agreements contrary to the law, code of 
ethics, morality, and rights and interests of defendants are inadmissible (see Article 
229(3) and (5) of the Draft Code). From this, one may imply that the court is obliged to 
review the requirement of sufficient evidence –a requirement which is provided for by the 
law. And if the agreement is found contrary to the law, the court must reject it. But this 
depends on the court`s appreciation. 
78 The Criminal Justice policy, supra note 14 at 17. 
79  This practice is ironically labelled as ‘charging to fail’.  See World Bank (2010), Uses 
and Users of Justice in Africa: the Case of Ethiopia's Federal Courts. (Washington DC: 
World Bank,) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/07/13145799/uses-users-
justice-africa-case-ethiopias-federal-courts> (7/10/14) ,p. xxi. 
80 See Oren Gazal-Ayal (2006), ‘Partial Ban on Plea Bargains’, Cardozo L. Rev., Vol. 27, p. 
2299  (by diminishing the cost to the prosecutor of bringing weak cases, plea bargaining 
decreases the incentive to properly screen out weak cases through prosecutorial discretion 
at the outset). 
81 See Article 25, the FDRE Constitution and Article 4 of FDRE Criminal Code, 2004. 
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similarly situated defendants differently without any principled justification, 
plea bargaining collides starkly with the equality principle. This problem takes 
two forms: differential treatments inherent in plea bargaining and those based on 
invidious grounds. 
4.2.1 Differential treatments inherent in plea bargaining 
Differential treatments, inherent in plea bargaining, take two dimensions, 
namely between plea and trial defendants,82 and differential treatments among 
plea defendants. Defendants accused of the same crime may be treated quite 
differently simply depending on their choice of plea. While those who waive 
trial for plea negotiation are privileged enough to benefit from the generous 
concessions of prosecutors and receive lesser punishments, those who insist on 
exercising their right to trial get harsh penalties thereby creating dual sentencing 
structures. In literature, this is known as trial penalty83  –a notion which captures 
the fact that trial defendants receive severe punishment compared with plea 
defendants, simply for exercising their right to trial.  
Even among those defendants who plea bargain, the result of the negotiation 
appears to be uneven and may perpetuate inequalities. The outcome of the 
negotiation depends on several extraneous factors of sentencing calculation as 
opposed to the degree of guilt –notably, the bargaining power of the defendant, 
the strength of the prosecution evidence, and other subjective considerations. In 
both cases, plea bargaining sustains differential treatment among similarly 
situated defendants, and this violates the equality principle and culminates in 
discrimination.84 
It can be argued that so long as both options (the option to bargain and the 
option to go to trial) are readily available to defendants, one cannot speak of 
discrimination. Yet, this argument holds little water as the options are not 
comparable to enable one make a free choice. In light of compelling sentence 
differentials, possible pressure from the prosecutor and the attorney to plead 
guilty, disproportionate interests at stake and huge power disparity between the 
                                           
82 While the notion plea defendants refers to those defendants who plea bargaining, trial 
defendants connotes those who exercise their trial rights. 
83 For more on this, see Russell D. Covey (2008), ‘Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining 
with Plea-Based Ceilings` Tul. L. Rev. VOL.82,P.1237 (“The ubiquity of plea bargaining 
creates real concern that innocent defendants are occasionally, or perhaps even routinely, 
pleading guilty to avoid coercive trial sentences.”); Albert W. Alschuler (1983), 
‘Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea 
Bargaining System’, U. Chi. L. Rev. Vol. 50. pp. 657-59. 
84 For more, see for example Stephen Bibas (2004), ‘Plea bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
a Trial’.117 Harvard Law Review, Vol.117, p. 2468. 
The Proposed Plea Bargaining in Ethiopia …                                                                      419 
 
 
adversaries,85 defendants would find it hard to go for the trial. As Gifford rightly 
observes86: ‘[t]he reality of sentencing differentials is generally enough to 
deprive defendants of any real choice in plea bargaining.’ 
Some proponents of plea bargaining justify the differential treatment by 
making a distinction between rewarding waiver of a right and penalizing its 
exercise.87 Thus, while defendants who waive their right and plead guilty are 
rewarded, those who prefer to stand trial fail to receive such rewards. However, 
it seems off the mark to make a distinction between the two notions: if pleading 
guilty is rewarded generously, the converse –pleading not guilty– is in effect 
penalized severely.88 Besides, the distinction erroneously assumes that justice 
can be attained in isolation of the principle of equality,89 while equal treatment 
is apparently an essential facet of procedural justice.  
4.2.2 Differential treatments based on invidious grounds  
Even though the conventional criminal justice system (trial) is not immune from 
this problem –at least in a different version than plea bargaining–, the concern is 
quite pronounced in plea bargains. The proposed version of plea bargaining 
which permits all sorts of non-transparent deals to drop or reduce charges, 
reduce sentence and manipulate facts, is prone to abuses and discriminations 
based on such invidious grounds as wealth, ethnicity, sex, religion, and political 
outlook, among others. This is not mere speculation.  
For instance, the informal practice of dropping of charges and conversion of 
custodial sentence to fine indicate the fact that plea bargaining discriminates 
against poor defendants.90 Though in a slightly different context, the informal 
‘plea bargaining’ made with real estate developers accused of crimes relating to 
land abuse can illustrate this problem. In this case, while government employees 
                                           
85 While the prosecutor risks losing its case, the defendant risks his liberty, if not his life. 
For debates on this problem, see Blumberg (1967), Criminal Justice (Where it has been 
argued that plea bargaining generates unequal treatment of defendants and that plea 
bargaining is unconscionable, Id., at 55); Note (1972), ‘Plea Bargaining: the Case for 
Reform’, U. Rici. L. Rev. Vol.6, p. 334.   
86 See Donald G. Gifford (1983), ‘Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion’, U. ILL. L. REV., p.49. 
87 See for example Richard L. Lippke, supra note 73. 
88 See Albert W. Alschuler, supra note 83 at 657-59 (1983), (arguing that :  
   If the concepts of reward and penalty are relative –if these concepts derive their 
meaning only from each other– the assertion that some defendants are rewarded and 
none penalized is simply schizophrenic. As Judge David L. Bazelon, referring to the 
implausibility of a system in which there are winners but no losers, once observed, “If 
we are ‘lenient’ toward [defendants who plead guilty], we are by precisely the same 
token ‘more severe’ toward [those who plead not guilty].”  
89 Ibid. 
90 See Alemu Meheretu, supra note 3. 
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who took part in the crime have been formally prosecuted, the affluent real 
estate developers benefited from the dropping of charges in favour of 
administrative measure of a payment of money. These differential treatments, 
though said to be justified in the public`s interest, 91 seem to enable wealth to 
buy justice.  
What is more, it would be troubling if plea bargaining includes negotiation 
on fines which is increasingly used in Ethiopia thereby enabling the rich to 
easily avoid imprisonment and ‘purchase freedom’ while the poor desolately 
face imprisonment. Even worse, the rich could comfortably use plea agreements 
to cover up their criminal liability in exchange for a payment made to an 
innocent person who pleads guilty for their crimes.  
4.3 The search for the truth/accuracy   
Although the weight attached to the search for the truth in relation to other 
values varies across jurisdictions,92 any system of criminal procedure targets 
truth seeking as its major objective. Ethiopia is not an exception. The search for 
the truth is one of the fundamental principles of Ethiopian criminal procedure 
law. It is expressly mentioned in the reform that the criminal process needs to be 
guided by this principle. The Draft Criminal Procedure Code specifically 
entrusts the judiciary with the duty to uncover the truth so that the criminal 
accounts for his wrong and the innocent faces no conviction. To this end, the 
court is allowed to go beyond the facts and arguments forwarded by the parties 
and call witnesses.93  While guilty pleas may dispose of cases, the court is 
mandated, at its own motion, to conduct a full-scale trial.94  In this sense, what is 
sought seems to be material truth as opposed to procedural truth.95 
                                           
91 The notion of public interest is a fluid concept. Unless carefully construed based on 
defined standards, which is not the case in Ethiopia, it is open to abuses and 
discriminations. Perhaps, in the case at hand, one may invoke public interest. Yet, it does 
not seem consistent with public interest when one considers the seriousness of the crimes; 
the real estate business has been accused of an entrenched problem the governments vows 
to address. The concessions exchanged between the government and the suspects can 
erode public confidence in the justice system.  
92 The difference is visible in adversarial and inquisitorial conceptions of the truth. See 
generally, Weigend, supra note 39 at 157. 
93 See Art 369 of the Draft Code, supra note 15.  
94 See Art 334 of the Draft Code, supra note 15. This echoes Article 135 of existing criminal 
procedure code. 
95 While material truth is understood to mean an objective truth, procedural truth represents 
–truth obtained in a contest that involves opposing views of reality in a procedure which 
ensures the fairness of the process. See Rachel A, Van Cleave (1997), ‘An offer you 
cannot refuse? Punishment without trial in Italy and the United States: The search for 
truth and an efficient Criminal Justice System`, Emory Int’l L. Rev.Vol.11, p.142; 
Maximo Langer (2004), ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: the Globalization 
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It is interesting to see how the principle of search for the truth fares with the 
proposed ‘Ethiopian version’ of plea bargaining which involves exchange of 
concessions and negotiations on facts. Generally, some try to align plea 
bargaining with the search for the truth. For instance, one writer argues that plea 
bargaining can get at the truth: (1) where genuine guilty pleas are tendered; (2) 
in the inquisitorial versions of plea bargaining.96 However, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to link plea bargaining with the search for the truth for it inherently 
subverts the latter. While plea bargaining is about compromise and exchange of 
concessions, the truth is about fact finding regardless of the interest of the 
parties to strike a deal.  
Plea bargaining in general and the proposed ‘Ethiopian version’ in particular 
undermine the truth. Trial and pre-trial procedures in any structure of criminal 
procedure target truth discovery as one major objective, albeit with variations in 
the conception of truth and methods of establishing it. In the inquisitorial 
systems, the procedures from investigation all the way to trial and post trial 
stages are designed in such a way that material truth can be established.97 
Unilateral and impartial investigation by the state (through the examination of 
evidence in support and against the conviction of a defendant), active judge, 
strict reviews, strong standard of proof, etc are designed to promote the truth 
finding exercise. Likewise, in adversarial systems, it is believed that the fight 
between adversaries in a structure that ensures fairness is the best way to 
unearth the procedural truth.98 Cross-examination, strong standard of proof, the 
privilege against self-incrimination and extended exclusionary rules are all 
believed to be structured to this end.  
By requiring a waiver of pre-trial and trial procedures designed to promote 
outcome accuracy at both criminal procedure systems (above) and substituting it 
with the haggling of the parties on the bargaining table, plea bargaining  
obscures the truth,99 and it involves “a compromise between adversaries, reached 
when the parties each independently calculate the terms of the agreement to be 
preferable to the uncertainty of trial.” Indeed, the primary concern of plea 
bargaining is not fact finding as such.100 It is rather about case resolution 
through compromise and negotiation of facts at the expense of the truth.   
                                                                                                            
of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure`, Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 45, p.10. 
96 See R. L. Lippke, supra note 73, p. 233-34. 
97 See Rachel A, Van Cleave, supra note 95. 
98 Ibid. 
99 See DK Brown (2005), ‘The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in 
Criminal Adjudication’ California Law Review, Vol. 93, p.1610. See also Gregory M. 
Gilchrist, supra note 73, p. 171); R. L. Lippke, supra note 73, p. 218. 
100 Ibid 
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In particular, this is for the most part true of the unlimited form of the 
proposed plea bargaining in Ethiopia where charge bargaining and fact 
bargaining are tailored to this end. The downgrading or dropping of charges and 
negotiation of facts, which are tenets of the unlimited model, are simply 
inconsistent with the truth-seeking objective of the system. In this sense, plea 
bargaining fails to not only accurately reflect the actual crime committed but 
may not also make offenders accountable to their crimes with the deserved 
punishment. The same holds true for sentence bargaining because the huge and 
uncertain sentence reductions involved in sentence bargains distort truth about 
what offenders have done.101  
What is more, the structural problems surrounding the plea bargaining 
process include factors such as attorney competence, workloads, resources, 
sentencing and bail rules, information deficits, and defendants’ preference to 
risk; and all these factors impinge on the outcome of plea bargaining.102 
Moreover, coercive sentencing differentials are issues of concern. In the 
circumstances, guilty pleas tendered following a bargain are less likely to be 
genuine.103 This is particularly true of jurisdictions like Ethiopia where the 
above structural problems are quite pronounced while procedural safeguards 
remain scant.104 
The clash between truth and plea bargaining is even more apparent where a 
criminal procedure, as is the case with Ethiopia, is designed to unveil the 
material truth. Research indicates that plea bargaining fundamentally subverts 
this version of the truth, in particular.105 As shown above, the Ethiopian criminal 
procedure arguably targets the material truth, which necessitates the presentation 
of all necessary evidence at the trial. The court is required to examine the factual 
basis of every guilty plea, go beyond the facts and arguments forwarded by the 
parties and consider additional evidence. In the circumstances, it is questionable 
whether plea agreements, which naturally aim to avoid the complete presentation 
of evidence at trial and which involve exchange of concessions and compromises 
on facts, can go with the material truth. 
A procedure can achieve the truth when it (a) singles out the offender from 
the innocent, and (b) punishes the former with a sentence proportionate to the 
degree of guilt.  However, the proposed ‘Ethiopian version’ of plea bargaining 
(which adopts the unrestrained variant of plea bargaining) involves negotiation 
and misrepresentation of facts, massive sentence reductions and dropping of 
                                           
101 R.L. Lippke, supra note 73, p. 233-34. 
102 Stephanos Bibas (2004), ‘Plea bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial’, Harvard Law 
Review, Vol.117, pp. 2468-69. 
103 For details see the literature on the innocence problem, supra note 9. 
104 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 3, pp. 172-83 
105 See for example, Weigend, supra note 39, p. 171. 
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charges meant to induce guilty pleas and thus promote efficiency, fails on both 
fronts. i.e., it is incapable of offering a reliable fact finding mechanism to arrive 
at the truth. Here a question remains106: Where is justice if truth is sacrificed to 
efficiency and legal expediency contrary to its core aspects of fairness?  
4.4 The principle of equality of arms  
Equality of arms, a fundamental principle of fair trial, involves giving each party 
a reasonable opportunity to present and defend its case, in those conditions that 
will not put any party at a disadvantage against its opponent.107 This, among 
others, could relate to access to evidence and the right to review adversary 
evidence, opportunity to examine witnesses, time to prepare for defence, legal 
representation, rights of appeal. 
Developed by the European Court of Human rights, the principle has now 
won international acceptance.108 In Ethiopia, its components can be discerned 
from the relevant laws and the Constitution. The proposed Criminal Procedure 
Code has expressly embraced the principle of equality of arms in its latest 
version.109 This principle aims at ensuring that both parties enjoy comparable 
opportunities so that the balance in the criminal process is enhanced. This is all 
the more important in criminal cases where the balance of power skews towards 
the prosecution.  
The power disparity between the adversaries is quite pronounced in the 
Ethiopian criminal process. While the prosecution enjoys state resources and 
powers, the defence has none of these and remains very weak. Structural 
problems such as absence of defence investigation, inadequate public defender’s 
services and the particular circumstances of defendants (who are mostly poor, 
uneducated, unrepresented and uninformed) exacerbate the situation. This 
creates an unbridgeable rift of institutional bargaining power. In the 
circumstances, plea bargaining, which involves disproportionate interests at 
stake,110 aggravates the power imbalance and puts the defendant at serious 
disadvantage in relation to the prosecutor.  
                                           
106 Ken Strutin (2013), ‘Truth, Justice, and the American Style Plea bargain’, Albany  Law 
Review,Vol.77, No. 3, p. 834. 
107 Kaufman v. Belgium, App. No. 10938/84, 50 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 98, 115 
(1986) (establishing the principle of equality of arms standard). 
108 See for example Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right 
to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 
(2007); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of Appeals Chamber (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
109 Art.15, the draft code, supra note 15. 
110 While the defendant is under a threat of severe sanctions, the prosecutor runs the risk of 
losing at trial. The two are not comparable by any stretch of imagination. 
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In some cases, plea agreements can be inevitable consequences/ 
manifestations of the inequality of the parties. This may be the case where pre-
charge plea agreements, which are allowed under the proposed ‘Ethiopian 
version’, are struck. In such cases, the defendant unaware of both the nature of 
the charge prepared and evidence marshalled against him, is simply in a 
disadvantageous position to make an informed decision. This leaves the 
defendant vulnerable to the manoeuvres of the prosecution and ultimately 
militates against fairness and outcome accuracy. The exclusive rights that the 
prosecution enjoys under the reform (the Policy and the Draft Code) on such 
matters as the right to appeal, the right to have the plea agreement approved by 
the court, the right to plea bargain anew or resubmit the agreement in case of 
rejection by the court, exacerbate the problem.   
Apparently, the legal conditions to plea bargaining such as the duty of 
disclosure and the requirement of legal representation are meant to address the 
above concerns.  But in reality, this seems unrealistic.  First, these guarantees 
fall short of narrowing down the inherent power asymmetry that is created by 
plea bargaining. The coercive environment under which plea bargaining operates 
(i.e., high sentencing differentials, incomparable stakes involved –threat of 
severe punishment vis-à-vis losing at trial, unequal institutional bargaining 
power of the parties, among others) remains as a concern. This is particularly 
true of unlimited plea bargaining where the above safeguards are less likely to 
be effective.111  
Secondly and most importantly, material and legal conditions specific to 
Ethiopia would render the guarantees less effective. For example, legal 
representation is not always mandatory; in less serious crimes bargaining with 
unrepresented defendants is allowed. Even in those mandatory cases, the quality 
and availability of legal service is severely constrained.112 Legal aid is poorly 
organized and remains neglected. This means defendants are likely to negotiate 
without a lawyer or receive ineffective representation. Similarly, the duty of 
disclosure would be marred by the absence of effective defence investigation (it 
is unclear whether parallel defence investigation is recognized), and other 
                                           
111 See A. Alschuler (1986), ‘Personal Failure, Institutional Failure and the Sixth 
Amendment’, N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change, Vol.14, p.149; Stephanos Bibas (2003), 
‘The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel’, UTAH L. Rev., p.1. 
112 See for example ‘UNODC Assessment of the Criminal Justice system in Ethiopia; in 
Support of the Government`s Reform efforts towards an Effective and Efficient Criminal 
Justice System’ at 69; Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems in Africa Survey 
Report`, UNODC, April 2011; See Abebe  Asamere (2011) , “የጠበቆች ሥነምግባር ችግሮችን 
በተመለከተ ለውይይት የቀረበ ጥናት” (Concept paper on  problems of ethics of advocates), 
Wonber, Alemayehu Haile Memorial Foundation Periodical. 
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problems include the timing of disclosure (which is apparently late during plea 
negotiation), absence of effective enforcement mechanism (no clear sanction on 
prosecution`s failure to disclose evidence), and the permissibility of pre-charge 
plea bargaining.   
4.5 The right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination  
Both the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence are 
envisaged under the FDRE Constitution (Article19 (2) and 20(3)). The privilege 
as recognized under the Constitution appears to be limited in scope in two ways: 
First, the Constitution mentions of the accused, leaving unaddressed, for 
instance, whether the privilege applies to witnesses. However, the 1961 
Criminal Procedure Code allows witnesses under police examination to refuse to 
answer any question where they believe that it may expose them to criminal 
liability.113 Second, the Constitution protects an accused person from any 
compulsion to testify against himself/herself, hence arguably limiting the scope 
of the privilege to testimonial communications as against any real or physical 
evidence.114 
One dimension of the right to silence and the privilege against self-
incrimination protects suspects from being their own accuser and from undue 
pressures meant to solicit self-incriminating statements. This is linked to the 
presumption of innocence. This principle requires the prosecution to prove guilt 
independent of the accused person’s active participation so that defendants are 
                                           
113 See the 1961 Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, Article 30(2). 
114 Generally the privilege is understood in two senses: narrow and broad. In the USA it is 
understood in a limited sense to apply only to testimonial communications.  While in UK 
(as well as in the eyes of the ECHR) the broader sense applies- it protects persons from 
producing documents (real or physical evidence) as well as testifying against themselves 
(testimonial communications). See generally Ian Dennis (2013), the Law of Evidence 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell). 
     Arguably Ethiopia seems to emulate the US approach.  The Constitution under Article 
19(5) provides : 
     Persons arrested shall not be compelled to make confessions or admissions which 
could be used in evidence against them. Any evidence obtained under coercion shall 
not be admissible.  (Emphasis added) 
     To be sure, the expression confession or admission refers to communications as opposed 
to real evidence. In this sense, the narrower version of the privilege seems to apply. Yet, 
one could also argue by emphasizing the phrase any evidence in the second limb of the 
provision that the privilege implies the protection of any evidence obtained under 
coercion, real evidence included.   
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protected from assisting their own prosecution,115 and it protects the accused 
from coercion or compulsion.116  
The existence of these rights requires the state to prove its case without the 
help of the defendant so that its superior power and resources remain 
counterbalanced. Nonetheless, plea bargaining undermines the right of silence 
and the privilege against self-incrimination.117 Threats and rewards aimed at 
having a defendant waive his/her right to silence are generally prohibited so that 
the latter is protected from compulsion. Yet, plea bargaining by inducing, if not 
coercing defendants to plead guilty on the pain of severe punishment at trial, 
appears to negate the purpose of the right to silence and the privilege against 
self- incrimination. In particular, it tends to oppose the essence of the privilege –
protection against compulsion from providing self-incriminating information. 
The requirement of voluntariness, a pre-condition to plea bargaining, seems 
to offset the above concern. However, since the very concept of plea bargaining 
operates in sentencing differentials which could be threatening, if not coercive, 
the problem remains. The inherent coercions involved in plea bargains are 
beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny.118 The coercive environment under which 
plea bargaining functions (i.e., high sentencing differentials, incomparable 
stakes involved –threat of severe punishment vis-à-vis losing at trial, unequal 
institutional bargaining power of the parties, among others) remains beyond 
their reach. This is especially true of their efforts to ascertain the voluntariness 
of the guilty pleas. Courts normally check if the guilty plea is free of physical 
coercion leaving the above coercive conditions (which may taint the outcome) 
unattended.  
One may suggest that the defence counsel could play a role to enhance the 
fairness and integrity of the plea agreement. Nonetheless, that is not promising 
for three reasons: First, legal representation is not always mandatory –as 
indicated earlier, bargaining with unrepresented defendants is permissible in less 
serious crimes where the defendant consents to it.119 Second, even in those 
                                           
115 This accommodates exceptions to the privilege/scope such as blood test, figure prints etc. 
116 S. Greer (1994), ‘The Right to Silence, Defence Disclosure, and Confession Evidence’  J. 
Law & Soc., Vol.21, pp.107–9; Mike Redmayne (2007), `Rethinking the Privilege 
against Self-incrimination’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , Vol. 27,No.2, pp.218-20.  
117 See for eg. Sanders, Andrew et al, supra note 72, p. 496. 
118 All the evidence and information remains at the hands of the parties. The judge is 
presented with the agreement. Although he may inquire information from the parties, the 
latter may have little/no incentive to provide him. Nor is the judge allowed to hear 
victims’ account. The requirement of sufficient evidence as shown above is not 
promising either. 
119 See the Draft Code, supra note 15, article 224. Nonetheless, bargaining with 
unrepresented defendants is unreliable for: (a) it distorts the power imbalance further; (b) 
it is not properly sanctioned; (c) any guarantee to it is prone to circumventions.  
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mandatory cases, the quality120 and availability of legal service is constrained by 
the limited recognition and respect of defence rights.121 Above all, effective 
counsel is likely to be hampered in an unlimited plea bargains.122 Thus, it is 
probable that many defendants go unrepresented or receive ineffective counsel.  
4.6 The right to appeal 
While the prosecutor is allowed to have appeal rights where the plea agreement 
is rejected, the defence has no appeal right at all.123 One rationale for this seems 
that once the defendant is convicted based on his admission of guilt while 
concluding the plea agreement, there is nothing that he can challenge at the 
appeal stage.124  A related rationale goes with the main terms/concessions of the 
plea agreement. In plea bargaining, a defendant enjoys the benefits of the 
agreement in exchange for waiving his right to challenge the prosecution 
evidence in the future, including appeal right. Nonetheless, waiver of the trial 
does not imply waiver of review by appeal. That is why express bans of appeal 
are often included by law or inserted in the plea agreement itself.  
Perhaps another rationale could relate to the outcome of the rejection of the 
agreement in that where the agreement is rejected, parties are prompted to go to 
full-scale trials, in which case the defendant stands to enjoy his/her trial rights-
including the right to appeal. Surely, this rationale would justify the ban only if 
full-scale trials were automatic to the rejection of the agreement. Nonetheless, 
that is not the case. The outcome of rejection of the plea agreement could be to 
prompt the prosecution to rectify the problem that caused the rejection, to plea 
bargain anew or to proceed to trial. Thus, to the extent that the outcome is other 
than going to the trial, the justification is less relevant. The need to appeal may 
arise where the plea agreement is accepted with modifications or erroneously 
approved by the court. In this case, the rationale is irrelevant. Some also suggest 
that the ban on appeal can be justified in the interest of finality and thus 
                                           
120 There are concerns as to the quality of legal representation defendants receive. See for 
example Abebe Asamere, supra note 112. 
121 The defence has no/little room to effectively participate in the pre-trial process. 
Interrogations are conducted in the absence of a lawyer, no parallel defence investigation 
as such exists, and there is limited defence access to resources and unparallel power 
between the prosecution and defence.  
122 See A. Alschuler (1986), supra note 111, p.149; Stephanos Bibas (2003), supra note 111. 
123 Art 234, the Draft Code, supra note 15. 
124 This rationale is commonly invoked to ban appeal in full-scale trials where a defendant is 
convicted based on his/her own guilty plea. As plea bargaining is a self-conviction 
method (i.e., a method which involves conviction based on admission of guilt), this 
justification is also valid to the ban of appeal in plea bargaining. 
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efficiency.125 Yet, efficiency cannot be pursued at all costs in disregard of 
accuracy and fairness. Thus, there should be some room for appeal. 
The ban of appeal leaves defendants with no opportunity to have their guilty 
pleas reviewed against any irregularity or unfairness in the process that are 
overlooked by lower courts.126 Besides, it is inconsistent not only with the 
defendant’s constitutional right of appeal but also with the principle of equality 
of arms. 
In the foregoing discussion, it is shown that plea bargaining exhibits 
numerous inconsistencies and clashes with many of the fundamental values and 
principles of criminal procedure. This is primarily detrimental to defendants. 
Where a defendant is induced to forgo his/her right to trial and submit to plea 
negotiations, he/she surrenders several fair trial guarantees. As Professor 
William Stuntz states:127 ‘in criminal trials the constitution is omnipresent, in 
guilty pleas [plea bargaining] it is nearly invisible.’ 
However, due to its managerial and efficiency advantages, plea bargaining 
permeates many procedural systems pushing full-scale trials to the margin and 
making  traditional values of fair trial give way for the new value of ‘process 
economy’128 – i.e., efficiency. As Damaska observes “the full adjudicative 
process is everywhere in decline”, and he notes that “the novel mode is for 
authorities to offer concessions to defendants in exchange for an act of self 
condemnation which permits avoidance of the adjudicative process or at least its 
facilitation” and thus efficiency. 129  
Conclusion  
Plea bargaining not only occupies a central position in many adversarial 
jurisdictions but also permeates diverse justice structures including the classical 
inquisitorial systems. Inspired by adversarial jurisdictions, Ethiopia has adopted 
the unrestricted or unlimited variant of plea bargaining, at least at policy level in 
addition to which a draft law is underway.  
                                           
125 Juliet Horne (2013), Plea Bargains, Guilty Pleas and the Consequences for Appeal in 
England and Wales (Warwick School of Law Research Paper No. 2013/10 (Special Plea 
Bargaining Edition). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286681 or 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2286681> 
126 Perhaps the exception would be review by cassation. However, it is plain that review by 
cassation is very limited to fundamental errors of law and not facts erred by lower courts. 
127 William J. Stuntz (2006), ‘The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice’, Harv. L. Rev, 
Vol. 119, p. 791.
128 See Regina Rauxloh (2010-110), ‘Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany- Will the 
New Legislation Be Able to Square the Circle?’, Fordham Int'l L.J. Vol.34, p. 329. 
129 Mirjan Damaska (2004),’Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts’, 
International Journal of Criminal Justice , Vol. 2, p 1019. 
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Although this variant of plea bargaining helps reduce case backlog to the 
extent that the problem correlates with full-scale trials, it is bound to pose its 
own tribulations which are either inherent to the institution, or typical to the 
version adopted by Ethiopia, or to the Ethiopian context. This author takes up 
one dimension of such issues: its  relationship with fundamental principles of 
criminal law and procedure and argues that plea bargaining in general and the 
proposed Ethiopian variant, in particular is not consistent with such principles 
which are designed to ensure the integrity of the criminal process. The 
principles and rights that would be adversely affected include the presumption 
of innocence, the principle of equality, the principle of equality of arms, the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. Nor is it compatible 
with one of the main purposes of any criminal procedure –uncovering the truth 
with the ultimate objective of making guilty defendants account for their wrong.  
The magnitude of the problem is not similar in all models of plea bargaining. 
The problem exists in a mitigated form where plea bargaining is applied in the 
restricted or limited model which is characterized by statutorily fixed discounts, 
the ban of charge and fact bargains, and rigorous judicial scrutiny.  That is why 
many inquisitorial/mixed jurisdictions such as Italy, Germany and Russia prefer 
this model over the unrestrained model, albeit with variations among them. 
However, this should not suggest that the limited model is capable of remedying 
the inherent flaws of plea bargaining, such as its inconsistency with fundamental 
principles and rights. Yet, sentencing differentials can be regulated by law under 
the limited model of plea bargaining thereby narrowing the gap between trial 
sentences and plea sentences. This model could also considerably mitigate the 
flaws of plea bargaining with regard to charge and fact bargains (which lack 
consistency and utterly defy the truth-finding endeavour). Moreover, rigorous 
review of the plea agreement applies under the limited model, and this enhances 
prosecutorial accountability.  In this sense, should it be inevitable that Ethiopia 
uphold plea bargaining, this limited model could be a lesser evil.                            ■ 
 
 
 
